#### STATEMENT OF

## IAN M. HAY

## **INAUGURAL PRESIDENT, INTERIM GOVERNANCE**

SOUTHEAST EMERGENCY RESPONSE NETWORK (SEERN)
HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION NETWORK – CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
(HSIN-CI) FEMA REGION IV

### **BEFORE THE**

## **UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT
SUBCOMMITTEE

#### **HEARING ON:**

"THE HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION NETWORK: AN UPDATE ON DHS INFORMATION SHARING EFFORTS"

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 2006

**ROOM 2212 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING** 

## SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT

'Let's Roll. . ."

-Todd Beamer United Airlines Flight 93 September 11, 2001

#### INTRODUCTION

Chairman Simmons, ranking member Lofgren and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, I want to thank you for your invitation; as it is both an honor and a privilege to be here today, especially so, given the topic and the imminently pressing matter of our Nations' Homeland Security. Testifying before Congress, has been a dream of mine that truly solidified during my studies as a Government Major (now political science) at Beloit College in Wisconsin.

I further appreciate the Subcommittee indulging the miniature State flags of HSIN-CI SEERN (FEMA Region IV) during my testimony; as it is paramount to me that we remain sharply focused upon who our organization seeks to protect. As each of the Members is acutely aware, heading into the final months of the election season, it is only through the consent of the governed that we have the pleasure and honor of serving our constituents.

I appear before you today because Critical Infrastructure (CI) is life. . .And the clock is ticking. It is ticking against Critical Infrastructure due to our enemies' determination and because we now find ourselves fully into the 5 to 7 year operational time horizon in which our enemy has historically executed their attacks. This is not to be sensationalist in any form. I say this because it is excruciatingly clear to me that if we fail to fully engage and integrate the private sector into our Homeland Security operations; 'we may fail to connect the dots.' We may very well, inadvertently, miss a critical piece of information which 'might' just prevent the next disastrous attack.

For this reason, my goal here today, is to share some critical insights into private sector information sharing, then shift to SEERN's experience with the HSIN-CI program and then finally, turn to a ten point section for some potential solutions; in the form of direct and specific requests of the Subcommittee and the Federal Government.

As I begin to lay out this case, I realize full well, that if fail to convince the Honorable Members of the true power of the private sector, I will have failed to impart how the 'eyes' of the private sector generally see things that would turn the average intelligence professional green with envy. I will have missed an opportunity to describe the truly awesome nature and nearly endless resources the private sector can bring to bear, in any given crisis.

In short, I will have failed to help secure that vital 85% Critical Infrastructure, solely in the hands of the private sector; upon which we depend for our daily lives.

## THE PLIGHT OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR

"We are continuing a policy in bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy."

- Osama bin Laden 10/27/04 Video

## No Infrastructure, No Economy. No Economy, No Government

Returning to my initial thesis, the fundamental miscalculation many people make is not recognizing the role Critical Infrastructure plays in our daily lives and our complete and total dependency upon it. That is. . .until it is gone. Without power, we cannot operate the machines and tools necessary to drive our economy. Without technology our financial systems and telecommunications fall back to the dark ages. Without fuel there is no transportation and, thus, no paycheck. And, without potable water, there is no life.

An attack upon any one of these Critical Infrastructure sectors, is likely just effective as an attack upon a soft target, such as a mall, school or nightclub. I would further assert, that the Governors and Mayors of our great States and Cities, have only had a small taste of the potential impact on local economy, tourism and families that the devastation would likely cause, if the infrastructure is disrupted (perhaps with the exception of New York or those in the Katrina region).

Aside from the obvious income factors of our constituents, why do we care?

## The 'Have' and 'Have Not' Worlds of Homeland Security

We care, because right now we have 'two Homeland Security worlds' in our country. One 'have' and one 'have not'. In the 'have,' the private sector must pay additional money, on top of their taxes, fees and expenses that they already pay to remain compliant.

In the 'have not,' they feel their taxes ought to be enough to provide for their general security, and so they refuse to pay more (potentially at their peril). Imagine for a moment, what the average private sector organization must contemplate when it comes to security? Should one pay \$10,000 - \$15,000 in order to become part of a 'sector specific' Information Sharing and Analysis Center or (ISAC)?

Or, perhaps, that same money would be better spent by hiring a security director, either from, or well connected to, law enforcement, the military, Homeland Security or the Intelligence Community? Or, rather still, should they spend that same money, on a top flight physical or operational security consultant? Tough, tough choices, especially when the increasing cost of security whittles down shareholder value.

This section could alternately be entitled, "The Over-Crowded Marketplace: Private Sector Outreach, Alert Networks, Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) and Consultants." I mention this because there are far, far too many options the private sector must choose from, all of which generate more guestions than answers.

The options for the average Security Director are truly dizzying when you consider them. He or she must ask: "should I join an ISAC? Do I need to become a member of trade organization, such as ASIS International, Building Owners and Managers Association (BOMA), or Business Executives for National Security (BENS)? Should they sign up for a Regional Information Sharing System - Automated Trusted Information Exchange (RISS-ATIX)?

Or perhaps, simply consider whether this 'free' membership under the HSIN-CI umbrella will cover all the bases and provide for all the business needs? Before we move toward answering this vital question, I beg the Members attention for one final point.

## Private Sector - Our Greatest Asset

Can the public sector truly engage all the resources available from the private sector before, during and after a disaster?

The short answer is an emphatic, 'no.' It's simple math really, if we accept that the country has roughly 750,000 law enforcement personnel; and the private sector has roughly 2,100,000 private security professionals (let alone, the number of security savvy employees out there); we can calculate that the private sector is almost three times (2.8 to be exact) more likely to interface with a 'street-level' terrorist than the average public sector agent or first-responder is.

This math is further illustrated, by an exercise conducted in Atlanta, last November called 'Target Midtown,' a simulated attack upon mass-transit. Within minutes of the Business Operations Center (BOC) being 'stood up,' we quickly discovered that the private sector was reporting street level movement and terrorist operations about ten to fifteen minutes ahead of first responders. Further, they were doing so from multiple vantage points via a variety of different communication methods (mobile phone, two-way radio, email, text message, phone camera, and instant messenger).

I specifically mention this because I fear that without fully engaging the private sector in information sharing and Intelligence we will categorically fail to find the next perpetrators in time, before the next 'Big Attack.' And this time, five years after 9/11, I fear the numbers could be staggeringly larger than those already heavy losses suffered on September 11, 2001.

The Government, DHS, FBI, and the DNI are still not yet aware of the enormous potential for intelligence and information sharing via the private sector. Therefore, we must encourage, develop and exercise these capabilities if we ever hope to secure our Critical Infrastructure from harm.

To finally bring this point home, I suggest the following example. Imagine if you will, five city map puzzles with 100 pieces each: Washington, New York, New Jersey, Philadelphia and Boston, all scrambled together, 500 pieces. While there obviously exists, the potential for 'too many chefs in the kitchen,' which option would you choose to solve the puzzle, if it were your loved ones directly involved in the threat picture?

Would you prefer one or perhaps, two Top Secret cleared intelligence analysts from inside the Beltway?

Or would you prefer five teams of three generalists from within the actual local jurisdictions?

Realizing that this example is simplistic; the lesson is both important and accurate. Because the private sector is able to see the puzzle from more angles they can potentially solve the puzzle more quickly. The problem still remains; however, that the private sector may not know, or understand what the threat is and, thus, the completed puzzle is almost worthless to them. They have no idea what to look for within the puzzle.

I burden the Members with this mental exercise because it is simply not enough just to stand up a piece of technology like (HSIN-CI) and hope for the best. We have to organize the people within the jurisdictions and teach our vetted membership what to look for, or we will never 'connect the dots in time.'

## WILL HSIN-CI BE THE ANSWER? - THE HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION NETWORK - CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE (HSIN-CI)

Local knowledge = Regional Strength = Homeland Security (HSIN-CI Motto)

## In The End - State and Local is the Answer

The only way to avoid another disjointed response similar to Hurricane Katrina; will be to drive this program via State and Local Governments, primarily through the State Fusion Centers, ideally to accomplish the following three things:

- 1. Create the preeminence of the State and Local relationship with the local and regional Critical Infrastructure and its leaders.
- 2. Support working groups to facilitate a direct understanding of Critical Infrastructure and the potential economic impact within the State and Local jurisdictions.
- 3. Most important, develop a local self-sufficiency planning model. In the event of a terrorist attack or natural disaster, each sector will need to be mentally aware of what action steps and requirements their respective sectors will have.

It is safe to say that it will be the State, Local, and Critical Infrastructure players who will experience the brunt of the event. Our job should be to ensure both parties (public and private) are fully prepared and integrated within the local jurisdiction, *before* anything happens or any kind of response is required.

A shining example of how important this concept of local operations is; would be the use of the National Emergency Resource Registry (NERR) during a disaster. If State and Local representatives are fully trained on the NEER, they will have the power to search the database for critical resources 'within' their affected region by zip-code and find their requirements, locally; ideally before FEMA needs to become involved in the acquisition of resources 'outside' the region.

### **Autonomous Local and Regional Governance**

If State and Local is the answer, then prior to any technology delivery, we must let each region chose how to organize their Governance. Only the locals know the 'lay of the land,' the personalities, and, thus, should choose the Governing body to represent them with assistance from program management.

## **SEERN's Unique Background**

SEERN's original program manager, Craig Caldwell, took this approach to heart and identified a group of almost 40 individuals drawn from each of the 17 Critical Infrastructures local to Atlanta.

He and the original Infrastructure Advisory Panel (IAP), as it was named at the time, called for nominations and held elections. These elections, held May 20, 2005, resulted in an Officer corps of nine individuals to represent the 3,000 plus members of SEERN, in an interim capacity for two years; or until such time, as a region-wide election could be held.

As far as we are aware, SEERN is the only 'active' region to date, to hold such elections, as the other pilots' regional Officers have been appointed by HSIN-CI program management.

Furthermore, SEERN is one of largest FEMA regions, with eight contiguous States, six of which are hurricane prone. This means SEERN must interface with eight separate State Governments while the average regions are typically comprised by five or six. We must also keep in mind that we have an extremely active region and we will likely require more staff and resources to serve the members properly.

Lastly, despite our repeated requests, SEERN was never able to host a full regional 'All Hands' meeting, in order to bring key leaders from across the region to help organize a more representative SEERN Governance. We also were promised an 'official launch' with a proper announcement from the Secretary of DHS that never came to fruition. That one single event would have boosted our outreach across the region unlike any other initiative imaginable.

## **Continuity and Proximity of Program Management**

SEERN was also the only pilot launched with a program manager from DHS - United States Secret Service (USSS), as the other program managers were drawn from the FBI. To date, SEERN has had a total of three different program managers in less than one calendar year (One from the USSS, and two from the FBI).

This is simply unacceptable. The lack of continuity in program management has seriously stinted SEERN's growth and continues to erode the support from the founding members who have invested a significant amount of time developing the program. Regardless of what management model we choose, we simply must get everyone on the same page and moving in one direction (like Washington crossing the Delaware).

In late August of 2005 the DHS leadership and National Governance Officers came to Atlanta and SEERN had one of the best Regional Governance turnouts in our history. Since that time, DHS has not returned in a year; and while the devastating impact of Hurricane Katrina is a fair excuse, it is high time the leadership returned to region, to get the program back on track. I honestly fear that we will need to completely 're-sell' the program in order to avoid losing key people.

Lastly, while there are certainly advantages to locating the HSIN-CI National Program Office outside of the beltway, not having representation or key staff close to DHS headquarters in Washington, D.C. will continue to set the program up for failure. The DHS leaders from the key areas: Operations Directorate, Private Sector Office, Intelligence Analysis and the Office of State and Local need to meet more regularly if we are to have any hope of developing and expanding the program.

## **Governance - Are Volunteers The Answer?**

A structure of pure volunteerism, unsupported by professional and paid staff is critically flawed. Relying exclusively upon volunteers meant only a few key leaders were doing all the heavy lifting, working into the wee hours and simply could not dedicate the time necessary to execute all the tasks that needed to be accomplished in a timely fashion.

This is not to say there is no place in the program for volunteers; however, any Governance model DHS leadership and program management contemplates, really ought to be significantly more geographically representative and should strongly consider using the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) standards to oversee its operation.

Finally, no matter the form or structure, the program Governance simply must be adequately supported by program staff, in order to accomplish the important mission of the program.

## **SEERN Continues to Lack Adequate Resources**

From the beginning SEERN has consistently lacked sufficient resources to conduct its operations and the vast majority of travel has been 'paid out of pocket,' by volunteers. And, these are but a few examples. We consistently have to rely upon the generosity of the local private and public sector for conference call bridges and meeting space. After two long years, SEERN still has no printed promotional material, business cards, etc., in which to conduct our vital outreach.

We have long made a joke in SEERN that HSIN-CI is one of the best kept secrets both inside and outside the beltway. We have been stunned by how few people are actually aware of the program, whose main source of PR appears to be generated 'virally' across the region and the nation one person at a time.

Perhaps our greatest challenge is the vetting process for the 900+ 'pending' members of SEERN, some of whom have waited in the 'pending' cue for more than a year. We neither had the resources, nor the time to recruit a sufficient number of gate keepers, to keep up with the ever increasing applicants. Further, the number of 'pending' applicants was so vast (nearly a one-third of the total SEERN membership), that the backlog was honestly insurmountable without significant administrative assistance.

## Push Network Vs Login Portal - The New Technology

On June 30<sup>th</sup>, 2006 we changed the rules on our customers. What once was a 'quiet' and 'push' network, overnight became a 'login portal.' This is not to say the portal is devoid of value, it has some significant advantages such as a master calendar and some great collaboration tools.

However, it is a question of what our membership base was accustomed to. At no time did they ever have to 'login' to get information, as the previous technology 'pushed' the information out via email text and attached documents. If we are going to change the rules, we need the time, resources and staff to help explain the new approach and train the members on the new technology.

The 're-vetting' of the membership on the new ManTech system was also a crippling issue as well. While we should always strive to ensure any 'imported' member is confirmed via the 'double opt in' standard, we simply cannot expect a senior executive to spend 25-30 minutes out of their busy day, re-vetting their HSIN-CI account. We need to find a faster and more robust solution, to safely vet and yet, still guickly process our applicants.

Lastly, the Subcommittee needs to be aware that we were promised in early 2006, that the technology would be ready and delivered early. The truth was that we reviewed the technology only <u>Seven</u> days before we were due to launch and go live with the new system. If this had been the Space Shuttle, wouldn't we have tested it? Do we honestly think we would have launched that vehicle under similar circumstances? Never.

## <u>Will 'One Size Fits All' Information And Intelligence Products Really Work For The Private Sector?</u>

At least in Atlanta, SEERN was never able to get to the stage where we could fully engage all the informational resources available to us, particularly the strong intelligence component of the FBI's Field Intelligence Groups (FIGS) or the local/regional State Fusion Centers within our region.

Our hope, was to create new information products for our private sector customers who have literally been forcing down same old 'gruel,' which arrives in the same form and has become even more diluted over time, than the original IAIP Daily report we started with in 2004.

We must survey our membership and identify their needs. We need to consider State by State and regional reporting, for those with narrow requirements; as well as, multi-regional reports for those members who have more broad responsibilities.

In short, we need to add some much needed substance to our morning oatmeal. . .

## DHS - FBI Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU)

I sincerely look forward to a day when DHS, DNI, and FBI have a mutually binding MOU(s) to share information, resources, staff and accountability. Only by getting these and other organizations on the same sheet of music will we ever approach integrated Homeland Security.

With the exception of a few occasions, at almost at every turn, the program has been forced to 'stand down', while we waited for some element of DHS or FBI to 'buy into' the next stage of the program before we could move forward.

We need to resolve this quickly, and the sooner the better. . .as this 'stop - start' approach will result failure and continue the lack of trust felt by the private sector.

## The True Cost of Failed Implementation

I'll close this middle section with two excruciating examples:

1. According to the current Food and Agriculture Representative to Georgia's Homeland Security Task Force, their sector still continues to wait for one national platform in which to communicate with their constituency. This Administrator was told that SEERN HSIN-CI's Food and Agriculture sector was going to come to fruition and provide their organization with the same information as the Food and Agriculture ISAC. In their attempt to be responsible and save the Georgia taxpayers from paying for duplicate information, they ended their participation in the ISAC. When HSIN-CI didn't live up to its promise, this group lost critical information and still to this day, does not have one centralized 'tool' to communicate with their vital membership.

In the wake of a potential Avian Flu epidemic, or the impact a Food or Agriculture event would have on daily international trade, this situation is simply unacceptable.

This and other groups need one clearly recognized tool, with a national platform provided by the federal government.

2. Anything short of a unified and well supported network brings us to the second example. A Water and Waste Water organization, has become so fed up with the successive delays of HSIN-CI; that they have recently considered disengaging from the program and designing their own system because they can no longer afford to wait for the Federal government to get its act together.

This is a preposterous situation and simply must be resolved, or it will continue to generate additional 'incomplete' choices, in an already over-crowed marketplace of alert network solutions.

## SEERN'S VISION - THE ROAD AHEAD - ABOVE ALL ELSE: ACTION!

"In any moment of decision the best thing you can do is the right thing, the next best thing is the wrong thing, and the worst thing you can do is nothing."

- Theodore Roosevelt

## **Vision of SEERN**

As the grotesque image of the World Trade Center falling into Manhattan Island retreats into the rearview mirror of our consciousness, SEERN has a sharp eye toward the future. Our focus is on a day where we are more secure than ever because we did hard work upfront. We strived to establish the best relationships and oversight. We performed the hard labor of meeting, planning and integrating both the public and private perspectives in our approach.

We will succeed where others have failed because we will have exchanged business cards before the event even happens. We will move stridently forward: Knowing we have access to the full 'bench strength' of the private sector; knowing we can build a robust alert network, capable of reaching our vetted members by 'any means necessary;' knowing we deliver the best information possible, in a format our private sector partners actually use and finally; knowing our partners will in turn share what they observe and become that 'x' factor multiplier that helps the region and the nation develop one clear and united Common Operating Picture (COP).

## The Ten Requests

As we continue to move forward and identify the best solutions, I respectfully request the Members of the Subcommittee consider the following potential solutions:

- 1. Establish a DHS HSIN-CI oversight committee, Co-Chaired by Director, Admiral Rufe, Homeland Security Operations Directorate, and Al Martinez Fonts, Undersecretary, Private Sector Office. Further comprise this committee with Chet Lunner, Office of State and Local, and Charlie Allen, Undersecretary of Intelligence Analysis (and anyone else the Subcommittee deems appropriate).
- 2. Request Private Sector leadership and input. Charge this committee to create a Private Sector Advisory Board under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) Guidelines. Find someone who is well known and respected by both the public and private sectors alike to head it. Be sure the committee finds individuals from each of the key infrastructures and that this group is drawn with geographical diversity from across the nation.
- 3. Select a technology. Whether it is the current ManTech software, the previous vendor YHD, or even a different system, let's be sure it works for our private sector members and then put our full support and leadership behind it.
- 4. Consider a program name change and re-branding as 'HSIN-Private Sector.' It will become clear the private sector members something has significantly changed and, yet still maintains the HSIN nomenclature which the public sector has now become accustomed to.
- 5. Make the statement in the open and in the press that this is the ONE system the Department of Homeland Security is going to use to communicate with the private sector, period. Request that President Bush, Secretary Chertoff and Director Muller jointly announce the program and its important mission to the country themselves.

- 6. Secure three contacts from each Fortune 1000 company and enroll them into a database. Let's commit to testing this databases efficacy by December 13<sup>th,</sup> 2006.
- 7. Recruit at least two points of contact from each State in the Region (ideally within the State Fusion Center or Homeland Security Advisor) to be trained on the system and act as the direct local conduit for the private sector.
- 8. Request that Secretary Chertoff and Director Muller (and or their staffs) meet to identify the problems with the DHS FBI MOU and resolve them quickly. Perhaps consider bringing the Director of National Intelligence to the table as well.
- 9. Let the individual regions choose their unique style of Governance with some basic guidelines under FACA. Assist them with developing information products which best serve their constituencies.
- 10. We need to double the funding and recruit a realistically sized staff, both in Washington, D.C. and within each region. We'll need the Members to get behind the program and directly help spread the word in their respective districts to bring the public and private sectors together.

Article I comes first in the Constitution for a reason; and we desperately need the Members to help us expand out capabilities and ideally, assist us by reaching out to their constituencies.

## CONCLUSION

"And, so my fellow Americans: ask not what your county can do for you – ask what you can do for your country?"

-President John F. Kennedy Inaugural Address January 20<sup>th</sup>, 1961

In conclusion, we need to fully engage the private sector and use their sharp eyes to help us 'connect the dots' and ferret out the 'would be' attackers before it happens.

We need to drive the program via State Fusion Centers ideally with the help of individual Members from within their districts.

We need more resources, structure, and a heavy dose of commitment & leadership from the administration. Without it, we are going to lose significant participation and the whole program will have to be 're-sold' at a later time, with a significantly greater cost.

While I have not grown blind, my beard has definitely grown grey in my service to my country. . . In the immortal words of Sir Winston Churchill: "Give us the tools and we will finish the job."

Chairman Simmons, ranking member Lofgren and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared remarks.

I sincerely thank you for your service to the nation and your time and attention today. I will leave the Capitol today knowing each of the Members will continue this vital and important work of the Subcommittee and I would be delighted to take your questions.

## PERSONAL BACKGROUND - Ian M. Hay

"The people who get on in this world are those who look for circumstances they want and if they can't find them, they make them."

## - George Bernard Shaw

In early 2003, my only credible claim to Homeland Security was from my family ancestry. I am a first generation American, and the Hay family originally heralds from Scotland, where previous members of our family both saved King Alpin during a Viking attack and later, when we were personal bodyguards to Robert the Bruce.

I share this, not out of ego or self-importance. I share it because it so clearly demonstrates how almost anyone committed to improving/enhancing our national security can have an impact, even with limited experience. Furthermore, I share my background so that you, Mr. Chairman and the Members of the Subcommittee become aware of my basis and perhaps even my naiveté in dealing with the intricacies of the Federal Government.

Reflecting back to 2003, I was a complete generalist, having never served in the military or law enforcement, let alone, even in private security. I was staring at a blank slate of how to serve and help protect 85% of the critical infrastructure (CI) which remains solely in the hands and control of the private sector. And, so we learned; learned by doing through trial and error. We learned the way General Washington did, in the field, with little to no training, resources, guidance, or much room for error.

We in the public and private partnership business learned together from tough lessons, fighting domestic terrorism during the G8. We learned the unspeakable truth, that not one single organization had an easily accessible list of private security professionals in one place; either by sector, infrastructure or even geography. We learned from the best, the people who herald from the only State and Region in the country to host both an International Olympic Games and a Group of Eight Summit (G8) within the last decade.

We in the Southeast know how to work together and know our process works. It is proven, it worked during the G8 Summit; it worked during the Threat to the Financial Sector in 2004; and, it still works today. Just as it did last March, when we 'cleared' a suspicious package event in 40 minutes (a response time which is virtually unheard of); at private sector property in downtown Atlanta, involving a stray box of electronic dog collars. I was actually on the phone with both a Georgia Official and a security manager with one of the largest banks in Atlanta, when the 'all clear' came through.

I purposely went into the Homeland Security business, the moment I discovered Mohammed Atta, had just used my hometown of Boston, as a launching pad for his inhuman and despicable attack.

Since that fateful day, five years ago, I have sought to serve our Republic to the absolute best of my ability and ideally, live up to President Kennedy's immortal challenge. . .

## Personal Acknowledgements:

I would like to personally thank the following people, if not for whom, I simply would not have been capable of delivering the testimony I have provided herein.

#### From the Public Sector:

Robert 'Bob' Hardin, who sadly, is upon the eve of retirement as an Inspector from the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) - Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center (GISAC); Bob Wynn, Former CSO for State Of Georgia, Colonel Bill Hitchens, current Director of Public Safety for Georgia and Former Director of Georgia's Office of Homeland Security, Jim Fullington, Special Agent In Charge, GBI GISAC; Becky Denlinger, Chief, Cobb County Fire and Rescue and a plethora of Local, State and Federal Officials too numerous to mention here.

#### From the Private sector:

I like to thank, each of America's Icon companies that I continue to work with, the entire SEERN Governance and individually, Ed Davalos, of Sprint - Nextel, Jim Carsten, SEERN Secretary, and the literally hundreds of private sector partners it has been my distinct pleasure to work alongside while we steadfastly protect region and our great Nation.

## **HSIN-CI Program Acknowledgements**

I'd like to collectively acknowledge: SSA Art Fierro, FBI; Ron Newman; Keith Wadell; and Phillip Hinckle for their role in the original founding of the FBI ERN in Dallas, which grew into SouthWest Emergency Response Network (SWERN). It was SWERN success which spawned the original four HSIN-CI Pilots and the concept that SEERN was predicated upon.

I would also be remiss, if I did not mention Jo and Michael Baldares of YHD Software, who really ought to receive a medal for what they and her company created in an alert network; as well as what they have endured as a DHS technology provider.

####

## **Follow Up Address**

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**Topical Outline** 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT

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Vision of SEERN

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PERSONAL BACKGROUND - Ian M. Hay

# DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT Required by House Rule XI, clause 2(g)

**1. Name:** Ian M. Hay

2. Address: 1711 Marsh Trail Circle

Atlanta, GA 30328

**3. Organization**: SEERN Interim Governance, as elected on May 20, 2005

4. Federal Grants or

**Contracts:** I have not received any federal grants or contracts (including subgrants

or subcontracts) from any federal agency since October 1, 2002.

5. Federal Grants or

**Contracts:** I have not received any federal grants or contracts (including subgrants

or subcontracts) from any federal agency since October 1, 2002 that are either under the preview of the hearing, or that I represent at the hearing.